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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF l'TAH,

Case No.

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

JOHN RICHARD !\IARK :\llLLER,

Dff enrlant-Appfllant.

11723

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
John Richard Mark Miller appeals from a conviction
of b.suing a check against insufficient funds in the Third
District Com-t, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant, John Richard Mark Miller, was found guilty
of issuing a cheC'k against insufficient funds by a jury in
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. On the
7th day of April, 1969, appellant appeared before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Court Judge, for sentencing
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and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the inde.
terminate term as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the trial 1:ourt
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of Facts but
feels that it omits the fullowing pertinent facts which are
essential to a full and accurate account.
1. AppeUant was informed on January 18th, two
days after he uttered the check, that the account he had
written the check on was closed (T. 98).

2. Appellant did not .go rto the Deseret Inn and offer
to make the check good (T. 99).
3. Appellant did not deposit funds in the bank or
maike arrangements with the bank ito cover the check when
it was presented (T. 86).
4. Appellant left :the Stalte knowing he had no funds
or credit with the drawee bank to cover the check (T. 86,
T. 99).
5. It is common knowledge, which this Court can take
judicial notice of, that Walker Bank & Trust Co., University
Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah, mainitains outside deposit
facilities for the convenience of those who wish to make
deposits to their accounts after banking hours.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NO ERROR RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS INVOLVING INTENT TO DEFRAUD.
Instruction number 10 (T. 20) adequately sets forth
the governing principle of law in this case. It states that
a prima facie case of intent to defraud is made out where
one utters a check knowing that at the time of presentation
no funds will be in the account to cover it. The instruction
goes on to explain that this prima facie case of intent to
defraud can be rebutted by other evidence or discredited
Ly circumstances, but if it is not it becomes conclusive of
the fact of guilt. Appellant claims that his requested instructions (T. 26 and 27) present a more clear statement
of the law than the instructions given by the court (T. 19,
20, 21). The general rule applicable to this situation is:
"It is not error for a court to refuse to give a
requested instruction if the subject matter thereof
is substantially incorporated in the instructions
given. A party is not entitled to have the jury instructed in any particular phraseology and may not
complain on the ground that his requested instructions were refused if the court, on its own motion,
or otherwise, correctly announced the substance of
the law applicable to the case, and this is true even
though the requested instructions stated the principles involved more clearly and definitely than those
given. PeoplP V. Barber, 62 C. A. 2d 206, 213, 144
P. 2d
374 (1943). See also the numerous cases
cited in Par1'fic Digr>st, Vol. 12 § 829 (1)."
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The Utah Supreme Court is among thosie following the
above cited general rule. State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d
208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960).
The instructions given by the court in the present case
stated the law in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 76-2011 (1953), as amended, and State v. Coleman, 17 Utah2d
166, 406 P. 2d 308 (1965). The instructions the court re.
fused to give emphasized specific parts of defendant's testi.
mony. The instructions given by the court allowed the
jury to consider the factors emphasized in the instructions
requested by the defense. Instruction number 10 told the
jury that the prim.a facie casie of intent to defraud, which
was created by uttering a check at a time when the maker
knew he did not have funds !in the bank to cover it upon its
presentment, could be rebutted by other evidence or discredited by the circumstances. Under this instruction, the
jury was charged to consider all the evidence and circum·
stances, including the testimony of the appellant. Under
the instruction, the jury could have found, had it believed
the evidence appellant offered, that the prima facie case of
intent to defraud, created by the uttering of the check, had
been rebutted by appellant's purported subsequent efforts
to cover it.
Appellant relies heavily on the Coleman case. In Coleman this Court said :
"It is not to be doubted that the making and
deliver!ing of a check when the maker does not have
sufficient funds or credit with the bank to cover it,
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in the absence of any other proof, is sufficient proof
to make a prima facie case of intent to defraud as
Sec. 76..:20-11 provides. However, any dther evidence
bearing upon the accused's intent must be considered. For example, even if he did not have sufficient money or credit in the bank at the instant the
check was made and delivered, if the proof showed
that he had arranged to have money or credit in the
bank by the time the check is presented for payment, that would negate any intent to defraud; and
the evidence need raise only a reasonable doubt as
to his having such intent in order to preclude his
conviction." State V. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 168,
406 P. 2d 308, 310 (1965).
The precise holding of Coleman is: where one utters
a check at a time when he does not have sufficient funds
in his account to cover it, but subsequent to the time of
drawing and prior to the time of presentment he deposits
sufficient funds to cover it, the fact of his making the deposit negates any intent to defraud. Appellant made no
deposit; therefore, the statements of the Court in Coleman,
supra, are dicta and not controlling under the circumstances
of the present case. However, instruction number 10 given
by the court in the present case is in perfect harmony with
the above cited quotation of the Court.
POINT II.
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR RESULTED FROM
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO TESTIFY AS TO INFORMATION
CONCERNING HIS CHECKING ACCOUNT RECEIVED FROM A THIRD PARTY.
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Although the principle of law quoted at the boutom 01
page 6 of appellant's brief may be an accurate statement
of law as a general rule, the exclusion of the proffered
evidence in the present case does not warrant reversal of
appellant's conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953)
provides:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regiard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
If error has 'been committed, it shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudke. The court must
be satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment."
Appellant testified that he was told two days after uttering the check that the account was closed (T. 98), that he
did not deposit funds in the bank or make
with the bank to cover the check when i1t was presented (T.
86), that he did not go to the Deseret Inn and offer to
make the check good (T. 99), and that he left the state
knowing he had no funds in or credit with the drawee bank
to cover the uttered check (T. 86, T. 99). In the context of
this case, it is difficult to imagine any testimony that ap·
pellant could have given that would have negated his appar·
ent intent to defraud. AppeHant attempted to testify as to
whait Mr. Glad had told him concerning the money appellant
said he sent with Mr. Glad to deposit to appellant's account.
Appellant's contention was that the hearsay rule was not
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applicable to this testimony because it was not offered to
prove the truth of what Mr. Glad said, but rather as circumstantial evidence of appellant's state of mind. Appellant contends thait the proffered testimony would have
shown he acted in good faith in leaving the state without
covering the check he knew was written on insufficient
funds. Even were we to assume that the proffered testimony had enough probative value to be relevant in light of
the other facts already in evidence, the tria.!l judge did not
abuse his sound discretion in excluding it. A common Law
rule of evidence which has been codified in California provides:

"The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantiaHy outweighed by the probability that its admission will
... (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues or of misleading the
jury." West's Annotated California Evidence Code,
§ 352 (1965).
The comparatively insignificant probative value of the
proffered testimony coupled with the difficulty the jury
would have had in considering the proffered testimony not
for the truth of the facts asserted therein, but only as circumstantial evidence of appellant's state of mind, support
the trial judge's ruling excluding the evidence.
The following language of this Court is as apropoo to
the present case a::-; to the case from which it was taken:
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"We are also conscious of the fact that a trial
in the courts of this state is a proceeding in the in.
terest of justice to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused and not just a game. We will not
reverse criminal causes for mere error or irregular.
ity. It is only when there has been error which is
both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the
accused that a reversal is warranted. The <lefen.
dant was entitled to a full and fair presentation of
the case to a jury of unbiased citizens and to have
his rights safeguarded by competent counsel.
has been done. State V. Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 126-127,
262 P. 2d 756, 759 (1953). See also: State v.
Valdez, 19 U. 2d 426 at page 429, 432 P. 2d 53 at
page 55 ( 1967) ."
POINT III.
THE CHANGE EFFECTUATED IN UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-20-11 (1953) BY THE 1969
LEGISLATURE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT
THE PENALTY AND SENTENCE AGAINST
THE APPELLANT BE MODIFIED TO CONSTITUTE A MISDEMEANOR.
Appellant discusses the question of law raised by
Point III solely from the common law standpoint completely
ignoring the fact that Utah has a statute governing this
situation, Utah Code Ann § 68-3-5 ( 1953).
In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226 ( 1964), the Court
avoided the real issue of the case (see the opinion of Jus·
tice Douglas and the opinion of Justices Black, Harlan, and

White, especially page 321) , and grabbed onto the general
rule at common law that repeal of a criminal statute requires dismissal of any pending criminal proceeding. iThe
Court, on page 232 and the following six pages, attempted
to show that the general saving clause in Maryland probably would not be applied. The Court had to make this
showing in order to support its holding, because it recognized that the saving clause statute, if applicable, rwould
nullify the common law rule.
Appellant also relies on Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41Utah154, 125 Pac. 389 (1912), without mentioning
that the holding of that case probably would have been
different had the case involved the repeal of a statute by
a statute rather than the repeal of an ordinance by a statute. After setting forth Utah's general saving clause statute, the Court said at page 162:
"Similar, if not identical, provisions are found
in many of the states of the Union, and, so far as we
have been able to learn, it has universally been held
by the courts that such provisions were not intended
to have, and do not have, any application to municipal ordinances, or to any proceeding instituted under them."
In short, the reason why the judgment in Lindsay was not
saved by the saving clause is that the savings clause does
not apply to ovdinances. The present case involves the
repeal of a statute by a subsequent statute, so the holding
in Landsn.y is not applicable, but the saving crlause is.
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The Utah general S'aving clause provides:
"The repeal of a statute does not revive a stat.
ute previously repealed, or affect any right which
has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty in.
curred, or any action or proceeding commenced un.
der or by virtue of the statute repealed." Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-5 (1953).
Acting under a constitutional provision similar in wordinae
to the Utah savings clause above quoted, the Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals held:
"The repeal or the amendment of a statute
prescribing the punishment for an offense after
final judgment has been pronounced, and while 811
appeal therefrom is pending, will neither vacate or
modify such judgment, nor arrest the execution of
the sentence when there is an aff irmance of the
judgment and sentence." Alberty v. State, 140 Pac.
1025, 1031 (Okla., 1914).
The sentence in the present case is saved by Utah Code
•
Ann. § 68-3-5 ( 1953).
Any modification of appellant's
sentence Lies with the Board of Pardons and Paroles, not
with this Court.
CONCLUSION
The rulings of the trial court in refusing some of ap·
pellant's requested instructions and in excluding some of
appellant's proffered evidence do not warrant a reversal
of appellant's conviction. Nor does the change in the law
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subsequent to appellant's conviction and sentencing entitle
appellant to ibe re-sentenced under the new law. Therefore,
appeHant's conviction should be affirmed without remand
for modification.

Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
AttJorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney Geneml
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

